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Teachers and pluralistic education
SIETSKE ROEGHOLT, WIM WARDEKKER
and BERT VAN OERS
Pluralistic education is an educational concept which aims at the development in
students of a so-called `pluralistic attitude’ . For its epistemological foundations the
concept is based on Dewey and for its educational and psychological underpinning on
the Vygotskian tradition. The concepts of activity, dialogue, and the importance of
diversity are central. Furthermore, an important tenet is that education can have a real
impact on the development of the students.
When invited to react to the concept of pluralistic education, a group of teachers
show a certain degree of a nity with it: they all hope to educate their students for a
positive participation in a pluriform society. They di er from it, however, in some
fundamental ways: in their conception of knowledge, in their stressing of security over
insecurity, in their individualistic approach to teaching and learning, and in their
quite pessimistic view of the possibilities for making a real contribution to the
development of their students.
In this paper, we will report on a research project which is part of a
programme called `pluralistic education’ . The concept of pluralistic educa-
tion is meant to be a contribution to the discussion on what `good
education’ is in our pluriform society. The aim of the programme is the
elaboration of this concept, as well as the development of concrete examples
of pluralistic education in the classroom.
The research project we report on consisted of talks with teachers to
investigate their conceptions of education and their responses to the idea of
pluralistic education. The argument behind this project is that, if we want
to develop concrete examples of pluralistic education, it is of the highest
importance to cooperate with teachers. Part of this cooperation will
necessarily consist of a dialogue on what exactly pluralistic education is
about, and what it looks like in this particular school and for these students.
Teachers, of course, will engage in this dialogue from the point of view of
their own conceptions of education. So it seemed important to gain some
insight into their arguments before actually starting a cooperative project to
develop pluralistic education. In this paper, the focus is on these argu-
ments. But to make sense of the account, the reader will need some insight
into what we mean by pluralistic education. So, we will start with an
explanation of this concept.
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Plu ralistic e d u c ation
Our work at the Department of Education at the Free University is based
on two traditions. One is the sociocultural view of development and
education, based on the work of Vygotsky and Leont’ev, and introduced
relatively early in the Netherlands by the work of Van Parreren. The other
is the continental tradition of pedagogy as a critique of education from the
point of view of the interests of the pupils. Based on these traditions, we
developed the concept of pluralistic education, which is meant to be a
proposal for `good education’ in the pluriform societies we live in. The
heart of the concept is, for that reason, the aim to develop in the students a
so-called `pluralistic attitude’ (Rang 1993). This does not just mean
tolerance. We see our pluriform society not as a society where di erent
groups, each with their own way of life, world-view and opinions, live side
by side and should learn to tolerate each other. What is needed is a
willingness to engage in a much more active way with diversity, even if
this is controversial. Even if we do not meet `the others’ directly in the
activities we participate in, their presence means a struggle, a challenge or
an invitation to us. Moreover, diversity does not exist only in the di er-
ences between `us’ and `the others’ . We all make ourselves part of vaguely
de® ned and overlapping groups, and, by doing so, acquire di erent ways of
knowing the world (in the sense of interpreting or making meaning) that
may not always go easily together. The pluralistic attitude that education
should foster implies a cluster of discursive virtues, as well as skills that are
needed to practise these virtues in daily life. Students need to acquire the
willingness and capacity to engage in argument about the interpretation and
solution of problems, to critically explore their own contributions, to allow
others to point out weaknesses in them, to look for new aspects of the
problem at hand, and to listen to what others have to say. The developing
of these discursive virtues and skills, however, is not the whole story.
Education should try to nurture the willingness, not only to tolerate, but to
welcome, the experience that we will never really know for sure `how things
are’ or should be, and the kind of insecurity that follows.
Part of the concept of pluralistic education is the conviction that the
way one looks at and deals with knowledge in the classroom has an impact
on the forming of the pluralistic attitude in the students. To explain what
we mean here, we follow Bernstein’ s argument about objectivism and
relativism, and the importance of going beyond them (Bernstein 1983).
Objectivism states that there are universal, eternal criteria by which the
truth of knowledge can be judged. This prevents us taking seriously ways of
knowing the world that are judged not tomeet to these criteria. Educational
practice nowadays seems to be ® rmly rooted in a naõÈ ve version of the
objectivistic conception of knowledge, in the sense that school knowledge is
considered to mirror `reality’ , and to tell students `how the world is’ . This
means that students who see things di erently are silenced. Moreover,
there is no place (or only a marginal one) for argument. Students learn to
take the authority of o cial knowledge (school knowledge) for granted.
This may result in a (false) sense of security.
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Relativism seems at ® rst sight to be the only alternative to objectivism.
Relativism states that there are no universal, eternal criteria for judging the
truth of knowledge, and that for that reason ± and this is, according to
Bernstein, the heart of the matter ± it does not make sense to try to compare
and evaluate di erent ways of knowing the world. Argumentation is
useless. At best, a kind of tolerance is developed by such an approach to
knowledge, but indi erence is another possible outcome.
So, neither objectivism nor relativism is appropriate to develop a
pluralistic attitude. For this reason, we are looking for an alternative
conception of knowledge. The philosophy of Dewey, which can, unfortu-
nately, only be explained here in the most broad outlines (for further
elaboration see Biesta 1992, Garrison 1995 a, b, Prawat 1995), can make an
important contribution. Interestingly, the so-called activity theory pro-
posed by Leont’ev (1981) has very similar consequences.
According to Dewey, human beings engage in collective, purposeful
transactions with each other and their surroundings. In these transactions,
they create and recreate meaning, or knowledge. This knowledge, in turn,
becomes the medium in which they shape their transactions, and so their
`world’ or `reality’ . New knowledge is required when the habitual meanings
and ways of acting are inadequate, i.e. when problems arise. In these
situations, people engage in the problem solving activity of inquiry. This is
a re¯ ective enterprise in which the participants take a distanced and critical
view on their habitual meanings and ways of acting. It is also a dialogical
enterprise, in which the participants confront di erent solutions with each
other from the question, What solution works best? This is a f`actual’ as
well as an evaluative question. So, knowledge is not considered to be value-
free, nor based on universal criteria. Knowledge refers to a man-made
world and is inextricably linked to evaluations of problem situations and
their solution. According to Dewey, scienti® c inquiry is not essentially
di erent from everyday life forms of inquiry, both in the sense that
scienti® c activities originate in attempts to solve everyday life problems,
and in the sense that in both cases the process of inquiry is essentially the
same. At the same time, Dewey stresses the importance of scienti® c inquiry
(meant not only as inquiry in the natural sciences, but in all branches of
academic studies) because of its systematic and powerful character. We
should guard ourselves against a narrowly technological interpretation of
this view on the theory± practice relationship. As Dewey states, scienti® c
knowledge not only helps to solve problems, but has the critical capacity to
point out problems and to suggest solutions that go against habitual
conceptions of how things are and should be.
Leont’ev (1981) and Il’enkov (1977), although writing in a di erent
tradition, make much the same point when they assert that knowledge can
never be `objective’ in the sense of lacking a speci® c perspective. All
`representations of objects in the mind’ are mediated by the human,
culturally structured activities of which these objects form a part. The
`outside’ world, therefore, is always seen in the social historical perspective
of particular activities. Since people partake in di erent activities, and
objects can be involved in many activities, objects acquire a `multi-
perspective’ character and are endowed with human (cultural) motives
teachers and pluralistic education 127
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and purposes. So, for Leont’ev, it is not the case that knowledge is a mirror
of reality, but the other way round: every object forms a `mirror’ of human
activities. Scienti® c re¯ ection on such objects can give us a deeper insight
into the practices behind them, without ever taking away their multi-
perspective character.
In the current discourse in education, however, the activity-bound
character of knowledge that follows from this theory (`situated cognition’ ,
e.g. Lave 1996) has been emphasized more than the multi-perspective
character that derives from participating in di erent activity contexts. As
Dewey’s theory is also more widely known, we decided to take his views as
our point of departure.
Dewey helps us to elaborate our educational concept by o ering a non-
objectivistic view on knowledge as something that originates in the context
of problem situations, and is inextricably bound to our desires, values and
intentions. Nor is his view relativistic. He implies that by ® nding ourselves
in a shared problem situation, we have enough in common to engage
together in inquiry, in spite of our di erent outlooks (Bernstein 1983). It is
this last point that we want to elaborate.
Dewey did not comment on the fact that there are many di erent, often
con¯ icting meaning systems that imply di erent ways of speaking about
problem situations, investigating them, formulating solutions, and acting.
Without breaking with the idea that people in a shared problem situation
have enough in common to be able to communicate, part of the concept of
pluralistic education is to stress the diversity of ways of knowing the world.
We want to teach students to examine all knowledge from questions such
as: What ways of acting does this knowledge make possible or impossible?
How do we value the results? Who are the people who engage in this or that
knowledge? What are their values and intentions? We want to make clear,
in other words, that knowledge implies a perspective on the world and its
problems, a position from which we look at things, and that it matters
which perspective we take. The same goes for scienti® c knowledge. This is,
as Dewey stated, more systematically arrived at. For this reason, it has a
special value. But scienti® c knowledge implies, nonetheless, a perspective
on the world that can be critically examined as such. We refer, again, to
Bernstein (1983), who, elaborating on Kuhn, stresses the interpretive
character of all scienti® c knowledge.
With this conception of knowledge in mind, we want to understand the
task of education not as showing the students `how things are’ by transmit-
ting to them the products of science, nor to hand over to them the
methodologies of the sciences as clear-cut, established procedures to be
followed, but to invite them to explore di erent ways of knowing the world:
What are their basic concepts, methodology, and forms of argumentation?
And, above all, What does the world become when you act in it from the
perspective implied in this or that way of knowing? In this sense, the idea of
pluralistic education represents a semiotic turn: it is not the world that is
the object of teaching and learning, but the way people speak about and act
in the world. Of course the students learn about the world this way, but
they learn also to realize that this is always a mediated, man-made world.
s. roegholt ET AL .128
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It will be clear that the concept of pluralistic education is akin to some
of the ideas arrived at in the discussions on multicultural education.
However, it represents a generalized version of those discussions. The
perspectivity of knowledge is seen here not as an accidental property of
knowledge in pluralistic societies, but as a fundamental property of knowl-
edge because of its intrinsic connectedness with cultural practices.
Although the necessity of the ability to handle multiple perspectives may
be accentuated in a speci® c way in multicultural societies, its importance is
not limited to them.
The d e v e lopm en t of th e plu ralistic attitu d e
The concept of pluralistic education needs not only an epistemological
grounding, but a psychological one as well. Although our interest in the
development of a pluralistic attitude in pupils was ® rst elicited by writings
based on German Critical Pedagogy (Hiller 1973, Moser 1978, Rang 1993)
we prefer to draw on the sociocultural (or Vygotskian) tradition. This
tradition shows a great deal of a nity with Dewey’s philosophy in the way
it looks at human beings as organisms engaged in interaction (or, as Dewey
says, transaction) with their surroundings in the context of collective,
purposeful activities, creating meaning while doing so. The sociocultural
tradition, however, focuses especially on psychological questions related to
ontogenesis: how do children learn and develop, how do they become
independent, consciously acting persons? The main tenor of the argument
is that children develop by acquiring the meanings of the culture they grow
up in. They do so by being engaged in all kinds of social activities, like
shopping, laying the table, taking care of a sick sibling, reading, watching
television, etc. (Bruner and Haste 1987). The meanings are present on the
level of the activity, i.e. the interpersonal level, and embodied in the verbal
and non-verbal actions that make up the activity. So it is not necessary for
children to have all actions and their meanings at their disposal before they
can participate: at ® rst, they participate on the basis of `a loan of con-
sciousness’ (Bruner 1986). The more developed participants in the activity
execute the actions that the child has not yet mastered. They help the child
to appropriate more and more of these actions. Here, a `negotiation of
meaning’ plays an important role. The child does not swallow the meanings
passively, but is actively engaged in trying them out. Children approach
what is new for them from the perspective of what they already understand.
In this process, children internalize (i.e. bring to an intrapersonal level, or
make their own) what was at ® rst present on the interpersonal level.
It is against this background that the concept of the `zone of proximal
development’ should be understood. Although Vygotsky (1978: 86)
describes this concept as the di erence between what the child can do
independently, and what it can do in cooperation with an adult (or, more
generally, with a more developed other person), it is quite clear from the
whole of his argument that he saw the interaction between child and adult
in the context of social activities (Moll 1990). Various factors are, therefore,
important for the nature and scope of the zone. First, there are the
teachers and pluralistic education 129
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knowledge, skills, desires and preferences of the child in a given moment
and situation. Second, the zone depends on the quality of the interaction
between the participants in the activity, which has, among other things, to
do with the way the i`nsiders’ attune to the `newcomers’ , and vice versa.
Important here is how Vygotsky sees the relation between learning and
development (Vygotsky 1986). He states that learning may at a certain
moment crystallize in a real change in the way a child experiences the
world, i.e. in development. This means that education (formal and infor-
mal) has the potential to push development forward. Vygotsky had in mind
here the cognitive as well as the a ective and volitional aspects of the
developing person. He sees an important role for formal education. It is by
formal education that the child can acquire so-called `scienti® c concepts’ . It
is not always clear what Vygotsky meant by scienti® c concepts, and his
conception has provoked di erent forms of criticism (Wertsch 1985, 1991,
Wardekker 1991). What is clear, however, is that for Vygotsky scienti® c
concepts consist of consciously held meanings. Scienti® c concepts repre-
sent an important new formation in the child, in the sense that they imply
the ability to stand back and re¯ ect on one’s actions in the world.
We ® nd it important, especially in our pluriform society, that education
should help students to acquire the knowledge that is considered important
in the form of `scienti® c concepts’ in this sense. To us, this means that
students learn to be critically aware of the strengths and limitations of this
knowledge in dealing with all kinds of problems. A way to do this is to
confront di erent meaning systems, i.e. di erent ways of looking at the
world, of pointing out problems and solving them. The meanings of the
students are taken seriously, not only as the starting point of the learning
process ± by de® nition something to be changed for the better ± but, as
other meanings, as ways of dealing with things that can be critically
explored. The teacher is seen as `representative’ of the scienti® c commun-
ity. The teacher’ s responsibility is to take care that, for instance, school
mathematics is essentially mathematics, although in a form that is appro-
priate for the students. In the zone of proximal development, he or she
takes care of those actions within the mathematical activity that the
students have not yet mastered, such as translating daily life problems
into mathematical terms, pointing out new problems that surface in the
process of solving others, using symbols, re¯ ecting on the process of
inquiry, including the quality of the dialogue involved, and evaluating
the outcomes. The teacher’ s task is to hand over these actions to the
students. In other words, the practice of pluralistic education consists of
engaging students in learning activities that are modelled after di erent
scienti® c activities (and, of course, artistic and physical activities, but these
are beyond the scope of this paper), seen as ® elds of problem solving,
investigation and argumentation in which they can learn to participate in a
critical and constructive way (Wardekker 1992, Roegholt 1993, van Oers
1996).
This is not done in just a few lessons or even a few years. Pluralistic
teaching and learning processes must be carefully constructed during the
whole of a child’ s school life. The ability and willingness to engage in these
kinds of complex pluralistic learning activities should probably be fostered
s. roegholt ET AL .130
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from the kindergarten years. Van Oers (1994) suggests we conceive the play
activities of the children in kindergarten as partially semiotic activities.
Within these activities, the teacher invites the children to use language in
problem solving, to make representations of situations they encounter, and
compare di erent representations. Much has still to be explored around the
question if and how education can indeed develop in the students the
complex personality trait we call the pluralistic attitude. Vygotsky’s view
on the relation between formal education and development, however, opens
up the possibility of looking for ways to do so.
The re se arc h proje c t
The overall approach
The project1 was restricted to grades ® ve and six and to the ® eld of social
studies (mostly organized as two separate subjects, history and geography).
We conducted in-depth interviews with 13 teachers about this ® eld (we
spoke with each of them for at least three hours over three or four sessions),
using as a starting point two teaching and learning units that were
recognized by all of the teachers as useful materials. The starting point
of the interviews was the question `What would you do in your class with
these units?’ The interviews were conducted on the basis of an item list,
including all the elements of educational concepts that were considered
important from the point of view of pluralistic education (aims of educa-
tion, aims, content and nature of social studies as a school subject, the role
of teachers and students, teaching styles and approaches, conceptions of
(school) knowledge, questions concerning the learning and development of
the students, etc.).
The two phases of the research project
The research project was divided into two phases. The focus of the ® rst
phase (six teachers) was the content of the educational concepts of the
teachers. It seemed desirable to acquire some insight into these concepts
before starting the second phase (seven teachers). In the second phase, we
set up a dialogue on pluralistic education between the investigators and the
teachers. The focus was on the arguments of the teachers and the unfolding
of the dialogue. We decided not to explain the concept of pluralistic
education to the teachers in theoretical terms and ask them for their
opinions, but to confront them with suggestions for other, more `pluralis-
tic’ ways of teaching, and see how they responded. The reason for this
indirect approach was that it seemed impossible to make this complex
concept and all its implications meaningful to the teachers in a necessarily
short period of time. The di erence between the two phases was only
gradual: in the ® rst phase we confronted the teachers with suggestions for a
pluralistic way of teaching, although not in a systematic way; in the second
we tried, as in the ® rst, to gain insights into their educational concepts.
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The selection of teachers
The aim of the research project was not to give a representative overview of
what teachers in the highest grades of the Dutch primary school think
about social studies and how they respond to the concept of pluralistic
education. The idea was rather to study some clear positions. For this
reason, we looked for teachers with an explicit interest in social studies, and
with the capacity to re¯ ect on their practice and possible alternatives.
Teachers who would agree to participate in this rather time-consuming
research project would fall in this category, so we thought. And indeed, all
the teachers we spoke with were able to engage in the kind of dialogue we
had in mind. They found it an interesting and stimulating experience.
Resu lts
The following description is organized around the question of what the
teachers think about knowledge: What kind of knowledge do they ® nd
important for their students? How does this relate to their aims of
education? What do they think knowledge is? Another important topic,
that can however only brie¯ y be discussed within the scope of this paper, is
how the teachers see the possibility of contributing to the development of
the students.
Teachers on knowledge: their pedagogical views
Most teachers (11 out of 13) see it as part of their responsibility to provide
their students with a certain amount of ready knowledge. This consists of
de® nitions and simple facts, but mainly of facts of a more complex nature,
for instance the connections between di erent phenomena (what has
Hinduism to do with poverty; why were cities in the middle ages built at
crossroads or rivers; what are the causes of acid rain). They give tests to
check if the students can reproduce these kinds of facts and factual insights.
The two other teachers (Arie and Ed2) do not intend to transmit this kind of
ready knowledge. They consistently use an inquiry-based teaching
approach and never ask their students for reproduction. But what they
have in common with their colleagues is the focus on connections between
facts. What all teachers share is the intention to provide their students with
coherent, structured knowledge as a means to understand the world. They
`weave a net of connections’ , as one of them expresses it.
There is, however, more to this weaving than simply connecting more
and more facts in a structured whole. Values play an important role. Most
of the teachers (11 out of 13, 10 of them in outspoken ways), state that they
hope to impart values to their students like democracy, equity, cooperation,
peace, respect, openness, and a rejection of exploitation. These values are at
the centre of a world-view, and understanding the world means acquiring
this world-view. They hope that the students will be able and willing to use
this view as an orientation for their acting in the world, and as a criterion
s. roegholt ET AL .132
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for critically judging opinions, ways of acting, etc. For the other group of
teachers (three; two of them, Gerard and Henk, were outspoken), a
structured way of understanding the world consists in an understanding
of cause-and-e ect relations, especially as are found in the interaction
between (groups of) people. By getting to understand `the way things work
between people’ , the students will learn how to act or not to act: when you
are nasty (violent, greedy, uncooperative, undemocratic, etc.), people will
treat you the same way. In fact these teachers also transmit a morality, but
this morality is of an instrumental nature and based on self-interest, while
the morality of the ® rst group of teachers is ethically grounded.
The teachers present structured knowledge to their students as more or
less self-evident. Facts, not only simple facts, but also more complex facts,
are treated as j`ust being there’ . There are quite striking di erences
between the teachers in the way they treat their basic values (either
instrumentally or ethically grounded). For some of them, the scope and
meaning of these values is clear-cut, while others are much more tentative.
All the same, they all treat these values as obvious, like they treat the facts.
There is no re¯ ection on them in any of the classrooms. This does not mean
that the teachers are not aware of the danger of a too strongly biased
in¯ uence on their students. On the contrary: 12 out of the 13 teachers are
aware of this problem. `You cannot bring up the kids in one direction any
more’ , and `There are always more ways of looking at things’ is how two of
them express their concern. Some feel the problem acutely and have given
it much thought, and all 12 have worked out some kind of solution. An
important part of this solution is to carefully choose neutral-sounding
words. A second part is to give their classes a balanced account of the
position and opinion of all parties in a social problem situation. They use
words like `objective’ , `neutral’ , `unbiased’ , f`actual’ , i`mpersonal’ , and
`nuanced’ , to indicate the way they intend to teach. Moreover, they speak
about the importance of openness and empathy for all parties concerned.
This striving for neutrality and openness is not only important in order to
avoid undesirable forms of in¯ uence, but also to teach students the attitude
of giving open-minded attention to di erent ways of living, thinking and
acting, without jumping to quick and easy judgements like `this is weird’ or
`stupid’ . The next thing the teachers say they do to avoid being too biased is
to leave their students free to choose their own position.
For Gerard and Henk, this solution is consistent with their intention to
transmit objective knowledge. For the teachers who want to transmit
values, however, it means a tension between desirable and undesirable
forms of in¯ uence. When it comes to the point, these teachers don’ t give
each party in a con¯ ict the same sort of distanced attention, or the same
amount of empathy. They stress, for instance, the poverty and hard work of
the Brazilian peasants,3 while speaking about the landowners and co ee
dealers more or less in terms of people i`n the wrong’ . The same applies to
the positions students take: the teachers take it for granted that these are
within the limits of the embraced world-view. A student who says some-
thing in favour of the Gulf War is snubbed. A student who agrees with the
landowners is called `a bit stupid’ . As was said before, there is a con-
siderable di erence in the way the teachers indicate the limits between
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acceptable and not acceptable: some of them draw the line ® rmly, others
much more hesitantly. But, again, none of them makes the line an object of
re¯ ection for students.
Teachers on knowledge: their epistemological views
It is not easy to get a clear sense of the epistemological views of the
teachers, because in general they don’ t speak directly about the nature of
knowledge. This is understandable, because the question what knowledge
is does not play a role in teacher training, nor in public discussions about
education. There are two exceptions in our group of teachers, Leo and
Maarten, who make some explicit statements on knowledge. But mostly we
have to construct the teachers’ epistemological views from their statements
on other topics. The aspects of their epistemology that are easiest to
reconstruct are the meaning they give to the concept of objectivity, and
the kind of relation they see between knowledge and values.
Gerard and Henk, the two teachers who want to transmit objective
knowledge, seem to understand `objective’ as `correctly mirroring reality’ .
At the same time, `objective’ means unbiased: only if one strives for an
objective (unbiased) account of the opinions, positions and actions of
di erent groups of people in problem situations, can one get objective
(correctly mirroring) knowledge of the cause-and-e ect relations that
become visible in the interaction between these groups. In so far as this
knowledge does not give clear directions for action, opinions become
important. Only then do values come into the picture. This position implies
the possibility of separating knowledge and values.
Some of the other teachers come very close to this position. They don’ t
want to transmit objective knowledge. They realize that in their account of
social phenomena in the classroom, as well as in other accounts, values have
their place. But while these accounts are not objective, they are constructed,
so these teachers say, on an objective base of factual knowledge. This
becomes clear when we look at the way some of them speak about the co ee
unit. Caroline, for instance, says at ® rst: `The co ee unit just tells the
children how things are over there’ . But the next moment she says: `I found
it very irritating, our prejudices are very much set up against the land-
owners’ . And Daan says: `The co ee unit just tells how capitalism works’ ,
but also `It is a bit like in the sixties, isn’ t it, the innocent workers and the
bad landowners’ . What they seem to mean is that the facts the author uses
to build the story are true or correct, but that the text as a whole is, all the
same, coloured by these opinions. They seem to distinguish two domains in
accounts of the social world: a domain of `plain knowledge’ , that forms the
factual knowledge base in these accounts, and a domain of values. The
relation between these domains is complex. It is possible to separate them:
facts are facts and nothing else, they are not touched by values. But the
domain of values nevertheless has an important in¯ uence on the story as a
whole. It gives, so to speak, a colour or ¯ avour to it. This happens,
according to these teachers, by the selection and organization of facts, as
well as by the way one puts facts into words. And here they can go wrong,
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so they say, in the sense that they make the selection of facts too biased, and
betray a too partial stance by their choice of words. They try to avoid these
mistakes, as we saw earlier. So, the knowledge base they build their story
on is objective in the same two meanings as Gerard and Henk give to this
concept. First, the facts are `true’ in the sense that they mirror reality as it
is. Second, they are selected, organized and put into words in an unbiased
way, so that the factual knowledge base as a whole also correctly mirrors
social reality, which is, after all, always complex and con¯ ict-ridden. In the
domain of values one can comment on the situation as described by the
facts, and discuss the problems at hand. The idea implied is that these
comments and discussions only come in the second place, when ® rst the
objective knowledge base is put into place. Jaap is the teacher who
represents this position most clearly. First, so he says, the students have
to get the facts, and only then can they, for instance, express their sympathy
for the poor of Brazil. And they should learn a dictionary-like de® nition of
power ® rst, before they can talk about the use and misuse of power. So, the
epistemological view of the teachers who take this position is very much the
same as that of Gerard and Henk: it is possible to separate (factual)
knowledge from values, and `objective’ means `correctly mirroring reality’
as well as i`mpartial’ . They di er, however, from Gerard and Henk by
stating that accounts of social reality as a whole can never be value-free:
they consist of values as well as of objective knowledge.
Leo and Maarten most clearly represent a third epistemological posi-
tion. They never make a distinction between the two domains in what they
teach about the social world, and they never suggest that these accounts are
based on objective factual knowledge. They never speak about the necessity
of gathering enough facts before evaluating a situation. First, so they point
out, there is a view on social reality, and only then one constructs one’s
account by looking for more and more facts, and making it continually
more balanced and nuanced. They use the concept of `objectivity’ only in
the sense of i`mpartiality’ . It is interesting that they use the concept of
knowledge explicitly in two senses: they speak of Knowledge (with a capital
K) to indicate stories about the social world that are inspired by a religious
world-view. Knowledge with a small `k’ is factual knowledge. Still, their
epistemological position may be not so di erent from those described above
as it seems. They do not seem to pose fundamental questions about the
nature of f`acts’ or `knowledge’ (small k), but seem to think, just like the
other teachers, that facts are just there, and can be found when you look for
them.
There seems to be only a gradual distinction between the epistemolog-
ical positions of the teachers (except Arie, see below). At the one extreme,
there are Gerard and Henk who see only objective, factual knowledge and,
completely separated from this knowledge, a role for values. Then there is
Jaap and the teachers who take the same position as he does: it is possible to
distinguish between (factual, objective) knowledge and values, but values
play a role in accounts of social reality. Leo and Maarten are at the other
extreme. They fully stress the role of values in the construction of accounts
of social reality. In this sense, they adhere to a more radically interpretive
view of knowledge than the other teachers who acknowledge a role for
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values. The other teachers (except, again, for Arie), take a (not always very
clear) position somewhere between Jaap on the one hand, and Leo and
Maarten on the other: some of them stress the role of values in their
accounts as a whole, while others stress the objective knowledge base within
these accounts.
The epistemological positions described above do not lead to di erent
ways of dealing with knowledge in daily teaching practice. There are
di erences, in the sense that most teachers adhere to a quite traditional
approach to teaching and let their students learn and reproduce knowledge,
while a small minority more or less consistently uses an inquiry-based
method and let their students produce knowledge. But when we look closer,
in both teaching methods the same view on knowledge surfaces: knowledge
consists of facts that are self-evident, and, as such, can be learned and
reproduced, or found in sources and put into essays.
Let us take Leo and Maarten as examples of the ® rst group of teachers
(traditional teaching method). They realize clearly that their account of
social problems as a whole is highly coloured by a certain religious world-
view, but this does not lead them to show their students this interpretive
character of the knowledge they transmit to them. They never talk with
them about the process of selecting and grouping facts, choosing words to
get the facts into the story, and the role values play in this process. In their
classrooms, as in those of Gerard and Henk, teachers explain and connect
facts, while students learn and reproduce them. Comments on the facts and
the situation they describe do not seem to have any in¯ uence on this core of
the teaching and learning process, and the same goes for discussions, if
there are any.
Let us look at Ed as an example of a teacher who uses the inquiry-based
method. He considers the facts the students ® nd in their sources and use to
build their own essays to be as self-evident as the other teachers, because
these sources are correct in the sense explained above: they are constructed
on a factual knowledge base that objectively mirrors social reality. The
students then present their work to their classmates, and, as in other
classrooms, it is Ed’s task as the teacher to make connections between
facts. This view on knowledge that is implicit in the daily practice of
teaching leads to a quite individualistic approach to learning. Facts are in
textbooks, in the story of the teacher, or in other sources. There they can be
found, and then learned or used by the students individually. When
teachers speak about cooperation, they mean the bringing together of
pieces of factual information the students have available from their daily
life experience or from the study of certain sources. The connecting of
these facts is, as we said before, the responsibility of the teacher, and, again,
each student tries to `get’ these connections by his or her individual e ort.
Only one teacher (Arie) seems to have a really di erent view on
knowledge and to succeed, at least sometimes, to translate this view into
a teaching approach. He speaks about knowledge as a perspective on reality.
In the perspective he adheres to, power is a central organizing concept, and
one cannot speak of power, according to him, without taking a value
position. So he adheres, like Leo and Maarten, to an interpretive concep-
tion of knowledge. However, he seems to break with a view on facts as
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things that are `there’ , as part of a reality that is `there’ . He seems to go in
the direction of a view on f`acts’ and `reality’ as things that are experienced
according to the perspective one takes. In the same time, he comes to a
more collective view on learning. He invites his students to take on a certain
perspective, and to investigate what they see and experience when they do
so. For instance, he gives them the task of writing about a con¯ ict they had,
using the word power. Then the class re¯ ects on what power is, and by
exploring together in this way the concept of power, the students learn to
experience their lives di erently. When they grow older, they can look from
the same perspective at complex social problems, or so is Arie’ s intention.
Teachers and pluralistic education
As we said above, we presented to the teachers, especially in the second
phase of the research project, suggestions for a more pluralistic teaching
approach. The suggestion that caused the most lively response concerned
the issue of dealing with textbooks or other classroom materials. It
proposed not to present these texts to the students as factual accounts to
be understood and learned, but as possible positions, taken by an author,
towards problem situations. The idea was that the teachers would invite
their students to ask the author of a text questions: What has been your aim
when writing this text? What are your values? What do you see as facts?
How do you organize your argument? What follows is restricted to the
responses of the teachers to this suggestion.
We made this suggestion when talking about the danger of undesirable
forms of in¯ uence. We asked if the teachers did not, in that context, see the
strong value position of the co ee unit as problematic. Wouldn’ t it be a
good idea to teach the students to discern and explore this position? Most
teachers said that the students do not recognize the colouring of a text ( f`or
them it is just true what they read’ ), and that this is a good thing in respect
to the problem of undesirable in¯ uences: in this way, the author does not
touch them with his opinions. This shows us something about the way the
teachers normally use textbooks, and how they see their own task in relation
to the textbook. The textbook delivers factual knowledge, while it is their
task to weave a net of connections and build the way of understanding the
world that they seek to transmit. They, as adults, look through the value
orientation of a text. On the strengths of this analysis, they can reject texts
of parts of them. But for the students, texts are sources of facts and nothing
else. Karel says so explicitly: `It doesn’ t interest me at all what the author
has to say. I tell the story, this is my power as a teacher, to decide what I
transmit.’ Though it is an important aim of almost all of the teachers to
develop a critical attitude in their students, this does not apply to the texts
they use in their teaching. For instance, Ed expresses his main aim in this
way: `I want the children to learn to ask themselves again and again the
question: ` I`s this true for me?’ ’ ’ But concerning the use of written sources,
his aim is very di erent: `I want them to ask themselves: ``Do I understand
this?’ ’ ’ When dealing with texts in the classroom as sources of factual
knowledge, it doesn’ t make sense to ask questions of the authors.
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When the teachers nevertheless re¯ ect on our suggestion, we see two
tendencies. First, they approach it as related to the question of how to help
the students to form their own opinions. If the students can ® gure out the
opinion of the author, this can result in a classroom discussion. Discus-
sions, however, tend to stay within the individualistic approach to learning
that was mentioned above: students learn skills and attitudes like listening
to each other, phrasing their contributions clearly, and giving arguments
for them. But this does not lead to a cooperative exploration of the di erent
opinions and arguments. Neither the position of the author, nor those of
the students themselves are analysed in a collective process of asking
questions and trying to ® nd answers. The students are supposed to take
home what they heard, so to speak, and then ® gure out what they want to
do with it. To form and change opinions is considered as something quite
private, not as part of a collective process of constructing knowledge. The
second tendency we see is a switch in focus from the position of the author
to the positions of the people in the problem situations treated in the texts.
The question is not how we handle the position of the author of the co ee
unit, but how we respond to those of the peasants, the landowners and the
co ee dealers. In this context, the teachers state again (a bit impatiently:
`we already talked about this’ ) how important it is to give a nuanced
account of all these positions.
Teachers on the development of their students
Another important argument the teachers use is that engaging in dialogue
with authors is too di cult for their young students. They do not approach
our suggestion from the point of view how they can prepare their students
for the learning of the complex skills and attitudes needed for such
questioning of texts, but from the abilities the students have right now.
This poses questions about how the teachers see their role in the develop-
ment of the students. All of the teachers seem to be quite pessimistic in this
respect. While some of them are optimistic about what the students can
learn, in the sense that they can reproduce important insights in their own
words, none of them expects to have a real impact on their cognitive and
moral development. They all have aims like teaching the students to make
connections between facts, to be able and willing to make their knowledge
more nuanced, to be open-minded, and to act according to important
values, but they do not see a real possibility of furthering these aims. They
see what students can do as, to a signi® cant degree, limited by their age, or
as a product of maturation. They see the development of the students as
mainly determined by factors that are beyond their control, like the
in¯ uence of the family and the neighbourhood, class and ethnic back-
ground, and intelligence. So, the only thing a teacher can do is tune in to
the capacities, attitudes and motives of their students, and follow their
development. Against this background, their evaluation of pluralistic
education as `too di cult’ is understandable.
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Conc lu sion s
There are important points of a nity between pluralistic education and the
educational concepts of the teachers we spoke with: their concern for the
problem of undesirable forms of in¯ uence on the students, their stressing of
many-sidedness and nuance, their striving for openness, and their intention
to get the message to the students that what is di erent is not `weird’ .
These teachers want to educate the students for a positive participation in
our pluriform society, which is exactly what we hope for. In the way the
teachers try to further this aim, however, they profoundly di er in some
respects from the concept of pluralistic education. There is no trace in their
educational concepts of a semiotic turn: students learn about the world,
they do not study di erent ways of knowing, nor do they explore what this
or that way means for the acting in and the making of the world. There is,
at least in the teaching practices of the teachers, no critical approach to
knowledge, nor a sense of the provisional nature of knowledge. Almost all
of them handle knowledge in the classroom as something apart from values,
and suggest to their students that it is possible to get the knowledge right.
The way they help the students to learn about the world is meant to
promote a sense of certainty, or so it seems: if you know how the world is,
you know, at least in broad outline, what to think and how to act. Pluralistic
education, on the other hand, wants the students to learn to handle the
uncertainty that comes with the insight that there is no ultimate authority
in knowledge. A very important di erence is, furthermore, that the
teachers do not see a possibility of contributing to the development of
their students, while the idea that formal education can extend the
cognitive, moral and volitional development of children is central to
pluralistic education and the sociocultural tradition in which this concept
is articulated. The teachers say that pluralistic education is too di cult for
their young students, instead of looking for ways to promote the qualities
that are needed to participate in pluralistic education. What is, moreover,
completely missing in their accounts, is the idea that it is possible to
organize the learning activity already in place as pluralistic education,
although the students do not yet individually possess the qualities to
participate, provided that they as teachers take care that these qualities
are present on the interpersonal level of the learning activity. More
generally, there is hardly any trace in the educational concepts of the
teachers of a notion of learning as a collective endeavour.
These traits of the educational concepts of these teachers are probably
not just characteristics of their individual thinking, but deeply rooted in the
traditional way of looking at education. This poses, of course, a problem for
the development of concrete examples of pluralistic education in the
classroom. It is not the subject of this paper to suggests solutions to this
problem. Moreover, only practical experience can teach us how to deal with
it. The only thing we can say here is that it will probably be important to
begin by stressing the points of a nity, and to argue that the concept of
pluralistic education o ers a more consistent way to promote the aims of
education that are shared by teachers and researchers alike, than the usual
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teaching practices. From there, it may be possible to build a broader basis
of mutual understanding during the process of collaboration.
Note s
1. A full description of the project and its results is given (in Dutch) in Roegholt (1995).
2. All names are pseudonyms.
3. One of the teaching and learning units we used as a starting point for our talks with the
teachers was about the production of co ee in Brazil and the world trade in co ee.
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